Abstract-In the last decade Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been gaining recognition due to the fact that they provide inexpensive solutions for a diversity of sensitive applications. However, these networks are at high risk to many routing attacks due to the nature of their deployment as well as their device characteristics. They are usually deployed in a distributed manner, unattended for a long period of time with limited network resources such as memory, bandwidth, energy and computation power. Therefore, security plays an important role. In this paper, we propose a reputation-based routing protocol that is sufficient to thwart the routing attacks in the neighborhood for WSNs. The proposed protocol maintains neighbors' reputations, based on their locations and packet transmission information to select the well-behaved forwarding node to transmit the data packets through multiple hops toward the destination. Our results illustrate the enhancement of network performance in terms of packet delivery as well as a reduced amount of attack selection in the process of transmitting packet to the destination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks provide efficient, inexpensive solutions for a number of sensitive applications in different domains such as military surveillance, industrial measurement and control, healthcare monitoring intelligent traffic and green aircrafts [1] .
Although there is a growing number of applications which make use of WSN infrastructures, the affordable security development which keeps the WSN facilities available for defining application's lifetime, is still under development and has not reached a required mature stage [2] . As a matter of fact, the availability of a long directory of potential security breached-attacks has been defined and new attacks have still emerged, which threaten the sustainability of WSNs functionality, nodes themselves as well as information aggregated and communicated between the nodes [3] , [4] .
There are many security mechanisms proposed in the literature for ad hoc networks that provide security measures such as authentication and cryptographic [5, 6 ] to a number of applications and manage to protect the networks against various attacks. However, these security measures which are so called 'hard security mechanisms' are complex and require more computing power, which the WSNs' nodes are lacking.
The scarcity nature of the WSNs has inspired a call for the development of security solutions that are more sufficient and affordable for WSN infrastructures. The affordable and sufficient security solutions mean that the security techniques proposed should be enough to take care of any packet transmission hindrances as well as take into consideration the issues of sensor node's resource constraints.
In this paper, we focus on the way of using node cooperation during packet transmission and node's locations to develop a secure routing protocol for WSNs known as a Reputation-based Routing Protocol (RBRP). The RBRP uses node's location and packet transmission metrics to build a reputation value that is used to isolate all misbehaving nodes in transmission time. The protocol manages to thwart routing attacks and achieves a high packet delivery ratio and at the same time reduces the number of attack selections in the neighbourhood The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section we describe the related works on the security in WSNs. In Section III we elaborate RBRP and define its security measures followed by the performance analysis and results in Section IV. We provide some concluding remarks and recommendations for future work in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
There are several works that have been done on security solutions to protect the routing processes and packets transmitted from targeting area to the intended destination for ad hoc networks. However, the majority of these solutions cannot be directly used in WSNs due to the following reasons. For example, in [7] and [8] the authors proposed the use of the public key cryptographic algorithm to provide defence measures for the WSNs, however the solutions are not efficient in both memory and energy, as the described early sensor nodes possess limited network resources. Other authors have used symmetric cryptography and or hashing keys to provide security solutions, but these solutions demand a frequent routing table maintenance using online distance vector [9] and/or on demand multi-hop route discovery and caching [10, 11] . Therefore, rather than developing security measures using hard security mechanisms, some authors have proposed the use of additional operations and/or extra routing processes to thwart malicious activities and improve packet propagation to the intended destination. In [12] , for example, the authors proposed a routing security approach by only enhancing the packet transmission logics and presented a beaconless self-protected protocol (SBGR). The work [13] proposed Secure Implicit Geographic Forward (SIGF-1) routing protocol, which keeps some routing information and statistical information of the neighbours to build a reputation value that influences the relay node choices. In [14] the authors proposed Dynamic Window Secure Implicit Geographic Forward (DWSIGF) which is a security approach that allows a packet transmission process to continue in the presence of routing attacks. By considering only the dynamic nature of opening a collection window time to collect forwarding candidates, the protocol provides enough security solution since the attackers cannot predict when the window will be open. Inspired by [14] , this work proposes the use of a node location and successful packet transmission and/or dropping to build a reputation value of the neighbours for routing operations.
III. REPUTATION-BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL FOR WSNS
The proposed protocol maintains the advantages of the DWSIGF routing protocol, while striving to isolate routing attacks and further reducing the probability of their selection. DWSIGF operates under 802.11 DFC MAC protocols, which are based on the RTS-CTS-ACK mechanism to transmit packet from source to the base station through multiple intermediate nodes. When a node has a packet to send, it normally verifies if the channel is free when its Network Allocated Vector (NAV) becomes zero. If the channel is free the node broadcasts an ORTS message (Open Request To send) to request the routing services from its neighbours located in the defined sextant of a 60 o direct line from the node to the destination. Those neighbours are known to be in the forwarding area and normally compete to provide routing services to the ORTS sender. Such neighbours set their CTS (Clear To Send) reply timer inversely proportional to a weighted sum of their distance from the sender, remaining energy, and the perpendicular distance to a line from the sender to the destination before replying to the CTS message [14] . On the other hand, the sender of ORTS dynamically opens its collection window time to accommodate some candidate nodes and when the time expires the window closes and only one node is selected based on the random or priority selection criteria. In priority selection the node that is near to the destination is selected to steer the packet toward the destination. In this way, the DWSIGF manages to reduce routing attacks since the dynamic way of opening the collection window time provides an anonymous time for the attacker to know or guess the exact time when the window will be made accessible. However, the protocol has no internal mechanism to protect the data forwarding process and isolates the routing attacks before or after it happens. Therefore, we propose the use of node's packet transmission information and node's location to build a node reputation that influences the selection of the next relay node. RBRP builds node's reputation based on the node's location metric as well as node's successful packet transmission or packet dropping. The following is the information discovered and used by the neighbours to build a reputation for other nodes in the neighbourhood.
A. Forwarding Behaviour
• Number of packet forwarded by the neighbour
• Number of packet sent by the source to the neighbour. This can be estimated by overhearing the packet transmission to the next hop.
B. Node Location
• the location of the node as claimed by the node during the deployment.
From the above collected statistical information the reputation value for each neighbouring node is derived as follows; 1) Forwarding ratio: is the ratio of the number of packets forwarded by the node to the total number of packets sent. C = P Forwarded / P sent (1) 2) Distance ratio: is the ratio of the distance of the forwarding node's last location from the source to the distance of the forwarding node to the destination. A = D source / D destinatio (2) Each node in the neighbourhood assigns a computed reputation by its neighbour containing a weighted linear mixture of the calculated values as follows:
Where, β and α represent the weight values of the forwarding and the distance ratios of the node, respectively. The computed reputation value for each node is at intervals of [0, 1] and is not shared with other nodes externally.
C. Forwarding Choice
As in DWSIGF, RBRP is configured to select the next hop in random and priority selection. However, unlike DWSIGF priority, which selects a next hop based on the node's location, RBRP is configured to select next hop based on its reputation. The node with the highest reputation value is selected. RBRP random selects the node randomly after discarding the nodes with lower reputation than the reputation threshold. This is contrary to DWSIGF random, which selects relay node randomly from the candidate set.
D. Attackers' locations
In the simulation area the two types of attackers were configured at different locations between the sender and destination to study the impact of their locations. A1 is configured to be an optimal relay node and is located near the sender. Attacker A2 is classified as non-optimal relay node to the sender and receiver and set to be near the routing path from sender toward the destination. The reason for setting different attacker locations is to examine its impact of the black hole attacks on packet delivery to the destination.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The performance of protocols is implemented and evaluated using MATLAB 7.0. The system parameters used in the simulation process are listed in Table 1 . We configure a simulation area of 150 X 150 meters square with 196 nodes having the transmission range of 40 meters. The area in the simulation was uniformly divided into 196 cells and each node was placed at the centre on the cell and then distributed using a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation of four meters. We narrow down the traffic to 100 packets for CBR flow and testing through many to many and point to point flows that are equivalent to periodic point to point communication and can be used in such a system of picking interested events from the field to the base station. The simulation area is configured to have six Senders and two Destinations situated on the left hand and right hand sides of the simulation area, respectively. All protocols are evaluated under increasing traffic load of 12 packets/Sec per CBR flow. We have evaluated the performance of protocols under different scenarios as follows;
A. Base system without attacks
In the experiment the protocols DWSIGF and RBRP are evaluated under increasing of traffic loads for the duration of CBR flow for comparison purposes. The results indicate that under light traffic loads the protocols (DWSIFG and RBRP) have a proportionate 93 -100 % packet delivery ratio; however, when the traffic starts to flow at rates of seven packets/second per CBR flow the network suffers traffic congestion with DWSIGF experiencing the congestion the most. DWSIGF degrades its packet delivery ratio to four percent compared to RBRP. The poor performance of DWSIGF is due to its dynamic collection window time, which may provide zero time in which no node is going to be selected as a relay node to forward a packet to the destination, thus forcing retransmission of control packets, contrary to RBRP's dynamic bound collection window, which ensures that at least two competing nodes form a candidate set. There is no big difference in their end to end delay, however RBRP relatively increases its end to end delay compared to DWSIGF due to the fact that the packet transmitted traverses across many hops before reaching the destination. Nevertheless, the trade-off strongest the security aspect of the RBRP. Also the overhead of RBRP modestly increases due to the high number of control message exchange compared to DWSIGF. Fig. 1 to 3 present the PDR, End-to-End delay as well as Message Overhead of the protocols and act as a baseline to examine their performances when these protocols are under black hole attacks. 
B. With black hole attacks A1 and A2
In order to create a black hole in the simulation area, Attacker A1 is created with the aid of CTS rushing, and then hurries its CTS responses so as to be selected as the relay node. Once selected as a relay node the attacker can just drop the packet and send virtual ACK to deceive the sender that it has received the packet. However, it has actually dropped the packet, and the PDR eventually becomes zero percent. performed poorly compared to RBRP reputation since collection window time allocated still allows the attacker A1 to be selected and consequently drops the packets and achieves PDR mean of 60%. However, RBRP reputation manages to improve the PDR to 98%, even though the attacker is the optimal relay since it manages to isolate the A1 when it drops the packet and degrades its routing reputation. For the randomized selection of the protocols, DWSIG suffers the most and achieves PDR of 70% since Attacker A1 is selected to send the packet to the destination but drops the transmitted packet. RBRP maintains a better performance of 90% on PDR as the attacker is eliminated at first, due to its low routing reputation value and not chosen in the process of building the candidates set.
In the second case when attacker A2 is involved DWSIGF and RBRP random all achieve better performance in terms of PDR, nevertheless, RBRP produces a reduction of 10% in attacker selection compared to DWSIGF with a 24% chance of selecting attackers. Therefore, the PDR for RBRP random also improves by almost 15% and is better compared to DWSIGF with 87% and 72% PDR respectively. The performance of the DWSIGF priority enhances the packet delivery ratio to 85% since the attacker is not an optimal relay and the chances of its selection are reduced. RBRP reputation improved PDR up to five percent compared to DWSIGF since the attacker is eliminated when the routing reputation declines. In this paper, we have presented a reputation-based routing protocol (RBRP) for WSNs. The reputation of the neighbor is maintained by a node which forms a fundamental building block of security measures of our protocol. RBRP builds its security measures based on the neighbors' nodes' activities in the neighborhood that allow nodes in the network to compute and maintain the reputation values of their neighbors. The reputation value of each node is used to identify well-behaved relay nodes to carry out routing processes as well as those misbehaving ones and exclude them from routing processes. This improves packet delivery toward the destination as well as reduction of attackers selection. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The plan for future work is to strengthen the RBRP with comprehensive security stack to protect the proposed protocol against external attacks.
